Governance·Developing·Last reviewed May 1, 2026
This page is a stub. I’ve marked the territory but haven’t written my views here yet. The headings below are placeholders — the actual beliefs, uncertainties, and evidence are still in my notes. If you want my current take on this topic before it lands here, get in touch.
Where I currently stand
<Headline view, drawing on your CLTR work: the field has rich theoretical literature on what AI risks look like and almost no standing infrastructure to observe them in deployment; the Loss of Control Observatory is an attempt to fix that. The core argument is that you cannot govern what you cannot see.>
Current beliefs
- There is currently no standing public-good monitoring infrastructure for frontier AI deployment, and there should be. ~XX% — direct rationale for the LoCO project.
- Real-time monitoring infrastructure is a prerequisite for credible incident response, not just a "nice-to-have" reporting layer. ~XX% — <why>.
- <Claim about who should host such infrastructure: AISI, third-party non-profit, intergovernmental.> ~XX% — <why>.
Uncertainties
- What is the minimum viable signal set that a useful real-time monitor needs? Why it matters: tractability of the whole project depends on this being small.
- Can monitoring infrastructure be built without privileged lab access, or does it require structured access agreements first? Why it matters: changes the order of governance work.
What would update me
- A successful pilot deployment of real-time monitoring against a single lab would meaningfully advance the policy case.
- A serious incident going undetected by all monitoring channels would strengthen the urgency case.
Recent reading
- <date> — <title> — <takeaway>.
Related writing
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