Governance·Exploring·Last reviewed May 1, 2026
This page is a stub. I’ve marked the territory but haven’t written my views here yet. The headings below are placeholders — the actual beliefs, uncertainties, and evidence are still in my notes. If you want my current take on this topic before it lands here, get in touch.
Where I currently stand
<Headline view on international AI governance: which institutional models (IAEA-style, ICAO-style, voluntary clubs) plausibly transfer to AI, and which fail. The realistic short-term ceiling is probably narrow agreements on specific risks rather than a comprehensive regime.>
Current beliefs
- Narrow risk-specific agreements (e.g., on bio uplift, or autonomous-systems incidents) are tractable; comprehensive frontier-AI treaties are not, on a 5-year horizon. ~XX% — <why>.
- Compute governance is the most credible enforcement mechanism for any near-term international agreement. ~XX% — <why>.
- <Claim about which existing institution should host frontier-AI work.> ~XX% — <why>.
Uncertainties
- Will the US–China relationship permit any meaningful cooperation on frontier-AI risk in the 2026–2028 window? Why it matters: existential to most international-governance designs.
- Can private-sector commitments substitute for treaty-level agreements in the short term? Why it matters: changes where energy should be spent.
What would update me
- A binding bilateral or multilateral agreement on a narrow frontier-AI risk would reset the tractability picture.
- A serious incident that drove convergent national responses would strengthen the case that crisis is the path to coordination.
Recent reading
- <date> — <title> — <takeaway>.
Related writing
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